Chapter XVIII
Endnotes

1 This chapter was originally prepared in Japanese by Lt. Col. Iwaichi Fujiwara, Imperial Japanese Army. Duty assignments of this officer were as follows: Staff Officer (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, Aug 39-Dec 41; Staff Officer (Intelligence), Southern Army, Dec 41-Mar 43; Staff Officer (Operations and Intelligence), Fifteenth Army, Mar 43-Feb 45 ; Instructor (Military Tactics), Army War College, Feb 45-Mar 45; Staff Officer (Operations), Second General Army, Mar 45 Jun 45 ; Staff Officer (Operations), Fifty-seventh Army, Jun 45-Aug 45. All source materials cited in this chapter are located in G-2 Historical Section Files, GHQ FEC.

2 The term Homeland includes (from north to south) Karafuto (Sakhalin) and the Chishima (Kurile) Islands, Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands, and the Ogasawara (Bonin) Islands.

3 Tokei Chosa Hokoku   (Statistics and Analysis Reports), Japanese Research Group, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ FEC, 30 Nov 50, Report No. 1: Gross Tonnage of Japanese Merchant Shipping Losses through Allied Action, Dec 41-Aug 45.

4 Imports of oil from the southern area in fiscal year 1944 were only 34 % of the wartime peak, of bauxite 42 %, and of rubber 55 %. There were no imports at all of rice from the southern area after March 1944. In order to make up for the loss, larger quantities of substitute foods from the continent were imported. Due to the shipping shortage and the diversion of shipping to this food haulage program, imports of heavy coking coal from Manchuria, North China, and Karafuto fell to only 36% of the wartime peak and those of iron ore to 33%. (1) Gomu Kogyo no Hatten   (Development of the Rubber Industry) Compiled by Mr. Katsumi Ikeo, Chemical Bureau, Munitions Ministry, 25 Nov 48, pp. 49, 70-2. (2) Gikai Hokokusho p. 111 (Reports to the Diet) Japanese Gov ernment Ministries; Summary of Staple Food Supply and Demand Factors Accompanying the Prolongation of the War, Sep 45. (3) U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Over-All Economic Effects Division, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on japans' War Economy, Dec 46, pp. 108-9, 121, 135. (4) "The whole South Seas plan to make good Japan's deficiencies .... was based on the erroneous assumption that ship tonnage .... would remain level. Because of the tremendous loss in shipping .... the South Seas were important for only the first year. After that the economy of Japan was based on China, Manchuria, and Japan Proper." U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, Interrogation of Japanese Officials, 1945, Interrogation No. 155. (Interrogation of Mr. Aichi, Cabinet Planning Board, Greater East Asia Ministry.)

5 In January, the U. S. carrier task force sortied into the South China Sea and began a campaign of destruction against ports and shipping. On 12 January, a convoy of 9 fully loaded tankers was almost wiped out off Quinhon, French Indo-China. On the 15th, a southbound convoy off Hongkong suffered a similar fate. (Statement by Capt. (Navy) Atsushi Oi, Staff Officer (Operations), General Escort Command.

6 The hopeless situation in raw materials and basic industry was not yet fully reflected in the important fabricating industries. Aircraft were still being produced at 69% of wartime rate, shipping at 47%, and Army munitions at about 72 %. (1) Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 2: Output of Strategic Materials in the Japanese Homeland; Report No. 3: Japanese Army Ordnance Production, January 1945- (2) Reports to the Diet, op. cit Summary of Production of Aircraft and Loss of Capacity through Air Raids, 1 Sep 45. (3) Nihon Kaiun no Hembo (Situation of the Japanese Sea Transportation), Mr. Genko Tsuboi, Sea Transport Board, Ministry of Transportation, 2o Aug 46, Attached Chart No. 11.

7 (1) Statement by Lt. Geri. Seizo Arisue, Chief, 2d Bureau (Intelligence), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section. (2) Daihonyei Rikugun Tosui Kiroku (Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Nov 46, p. 294.

8 (1) Sojo Sho Sambo Socho Gunreibu Socho   (Report to the Throne by the Chiefs of Army and Navy General Staffs) 19 Jan 45. (2) Saiko Senso Shido Kaigi Tsuzuri  (Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council) Report No. 10, 15 Feb 45. (3) Statement by Col. Takushiro Hattori, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.

9 Forces available to the Fifth Area Army for the defense of the Northeast Area were as follows:

Lt. Gen. Higuchi exercised a combined operational command including naval units. Since stress had been laid on the defenses of the Northeast Area ever since the loss of Attu in May 1943, a high state of preparedness had been reached. On 27 March 1944 the headquarters of both the Twenty-seventh Army and Fifth Area Army had been activated, the latter replacing the Northern Army which had previously absorbed the Northern District Army on 11 February 1943. There were now, however, only 36 operational aircraft in the 1st Air Division and Twelfth Air Fleet combined, mostly long-range reconnaissance planes. (1) Hondo Sakusen Kiroku   (Homeland Operations Record), Vol. IV Fifth Area Army, 1st Demobilization Bureau, Oct 46, pp. 4-6, 16-8, 24-6. (2) Dairikumei Dai Senhachijuyongo  (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1084) 24 Jul 44. (3) Hoppo Homen no Sakusen (Northern Area Naval Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Mar 49, p. 74. (4) Report to the Throne, op. cit.

10 Sixth Air Army under Lt. Gen. Michio Sugawara had the basic mission of long-range air attacks against enemy invasion bases and convoys. However, most of the aircraft were unsuitable for such operations and were detached from the Air Army for air defense. Of the approximately l00 long-range planes available, slightly more than half were assigned to the 7th and 98th Bomber Regiments, these units being attached to the 11th Air Flotilla in Kyushu for operations. This left the effective air strength of Sixth Air Army at less than 50 planes. In mid-January, Imperial General Headquarters issued a policy memorandum to Sixth Air Army indicating its desire that emphasis be placed on the speedy organization of tokko units to facilitate the execution of its basic mission. (1) Dairikumei Dai Sennihyakujuni- go  (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1212) 26 Dec 44. (2) Report to the Throne, op. cit. (3) Iwo Jima oyobi Nansei Shoto Homen Koku Sakusen Kiroku (Iwo Jima and Ryukyu Islands Air Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Aug 46, p, 12. (4) Statements by Capt. Mitsuo Fuchida, Staff Officer (Operations), Combined Fleet, and Lt. Col. Takashi Kagoshima, Staff Officer (Air Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.

11 On 1 January 1945, the organization of the Second Fleet was as follows:

Nihon Kaigun Hensei Suii oyobi Heiryoku Soshitsu Hyo (Table Showing Organizational Changes and Losses of Japanese Naval Forces) 2d Demobitization Bureau, Oct 49, pp . D-3-5; J-44, 47.

12 Due to the situation in the Philippines, Combined Fleet decided that any further commitment of naval air forces to the Philippine area would be impracticable. First Air Fleet was accordingly transferred on 9 January to Formosa where it replaced the deactivated Second Air Fleet. (Cf. Chapter XI, p. 309 and Chapter XIV, p. 433) Okinawa Homen no Kaigun Sakusen (Okinawa Area Naval Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Oct 47, pp. 15-6.

13 (1) Ibid., pp. 12-3. (2) Report to the Throne, op. cit. (3) In addition to the units mentioned, the 8th Air Division operating off Formosa under Tenth Area Army command was available for limited attack operations over Homeland approaches. Although its 126 aircraft were primarily fighters organization of tokko units and recoupment of bomber strength was proceeding rapidly. (Statement by Lt. Col. Kanichi Ishikawa, Staff Officer (Operations), 8th Air Division.)

14 Although a few scattered raids had been conducted on northern Kyushu in the summer of 1944 by enemy B-29's operating from bases in China, the Superfortress campaign against Japan did not begin in earnest until November 1944. Operating from bases in the Marianas, the B-29's flew a total of 500 sorties against a variety of industrial targets in Tokyo and Nagoya during November and December, one raid involving about 100 enemy aircraft. The raids steadily mounted in frequency and intensity so that during January an additional about 600 sorties were flown, Kobe and Osaka being added to the target list. While these raids, using primarily high explosives, did little damage, they did serve to bring home to the people the desperate plight of the nation. (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. tit., P. 322. (2) Jiji Nenkan  (Jiji Year Book) Jiji Press Co., Tokyo, 5 Jan 47, p. 151.

15 (1) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. I: General Defense Command, pp. 32-33. (2) Report to the Throne, op. cit. (3) Daikairei Dai Sanju-go   (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 30) 19 Jul 44. (4) Table Showing Organizational Changes and Losses of Japanese Naval Forces, op. Cit., pp. J-15, 19.

16 (1) Dairikumei Dai Senhachijuichi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 10 81) 24 Jul 44. (2) Dairikushi Dai Nisenhyakushichijuroku-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No 2176) 22 Sep 44. (Cf. Chapter XI, pp. 295-301 and Chapter XII, pp. 328-30.)

17 All eight of these divisions had been activated during July 1944 as part of the preparation for Sho No. 3 operation. In addition to the indicated units, the 1st Imperial Guards Division, which had been formed on 14 May 1943 from the Imperial Guards Depot Division, was stationed in Tokyo under command of the Eastern District Army, but was considered as not being available in connection with the defense of the Homeland in view of its mission of securing the Imperial Palace, the role formerly executed by the Imperial Guards Depot Division. Moreover, the 84th Division, also activated in July 1944, was also in the Homeland waiting at Himeji for transportation to Okinawa. (Cf. n. 34) Also in the Homeland to aid the combat divisions in their preparations were the staff and overhead of 13 depot divisions located at Tokyo, Sendai, Utsunomiya, Kanazawa, Hirosaki, Nagoya, Osaka, Kyoto, Himeji, Zentsuji, Hiro shima, Kumamoto, and Kurume. (1) Hengo Butai Gaiken Hyo (Unit Organization Tables) Army General Staff. (2) Statment by Col. Hiroshi Fuwa, Staff Officer (Operations), First General Army. (3) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. I., pp. 49-50.

18 (1) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit. (2) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 49-50. (3) Dairikumei Dai Senhachijuroku-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1086) 26 Jul 44.

19 Sho No. 3 plan called for the employment of the following nuclear infantry and heavy artillery strength in these coastal defense positions:

Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 53.

20 Because defense policy had not yet been definitely formulated by the High Command, most of these fortifications, following as they did the tactical idiosyncrasies of the local commanders, were later found to be inadequate and in some cases useless. (1) Ibid., pp. 51-4. (2) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. III; Second General Army, pp. 6-7.

21 Tenth Area Army forces were disposed as follows:

Tenth Area Army
          8th Air Division-Formosa
          66th Division-Formosa
          76th Independent Mixed Brigade-Formosa
Fortieth Army-Formosa
          9th, 12th, 50th, and 71st Divisions
          75th Independent Mixed Brigade
Thirty-second Army-Ryukyus
          24th, 28th, and 62d Divisions
          44th, 45th, 59th, 60th and 64th Independent Mixed Brigades

(1) Dai Sanjuni Gun Shijitsu Shiryo ( Historical Data, Thirty-second Army) Home Depot Division, Mar 47, pp. 7-10. (2) Taiwan Homen Sakusen Kiroku (Formosa Area Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Aug 46, pp. 105-12. (3) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit.

22 Attached to the 109th Division were the 145th Infantry Regiment, the 12th and 17th Independent Mixed Regiments, and the 26th Tank Regiment. (1) Chubu Taiheiyo Homen Sakusen Kiroku (Central Pacific Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Nov 46, Vol. I, 98, 103-4. (2) Dairikumei Dai Sensanju-bachi, Senyonjugo-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Orders No. 1038 and 1045) 26 Jun and 1 Jul 45.

23 The chief controversy centered around air operations over the Homeland defense perimeter. The Army insisted that a maximum effort be planned over the East China Sea area, even to the extent of stripping eastern Japan of its strength. The Navy, on the other hand, was extremely chary of undertaking any large scale air operation until May, wishing to avoid a premature, piecemeal commitment while rebuilding its shattered air forces. The Army point of view finally prevailed and became High Command policy. (Statements by Rear Adm. Sadatoshi Tomioka, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Capt. Toshikazu Ohmae, Staff Officer (Operations), and Comdr. Yoshimori Terai, Staff Officer (Operations), all of Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Section; and Col. Ichiji Sugita, Staff Officer (Opera tions), and Lt. Col. Takashi Kagoshima, Staff Officer (Air Operations), both of Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.)

24 (1) Daikairei Dai Sanjushichi-go Bessatsu Teikoku Rikukaigun Sakusen Keikaku Taiko (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 37, Separate Table, Outline of Army and Navy Operations) 20 Jan 45. (Plate No. 143 is a facsimile reproduction of a portion of this document.) (2) Report to the Throne, op. cit. (3) Statements by Lt. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Col. Hiromu Hosoda, Staff Officer (Operations), both of Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, and Col. Takushiro Hattori, previously cited. (4) To support the operational plans the Supreme War Direction Council, on 25 January, laid down the basic national logistics plan. Top priority was given to aircraft, special-attack weapons, antiaircraft, petroleum products, food, and ships. Raw material and basic commodity goals for 1945 were set as follows: Carbonsteel-3,000,000 metric tons; coal-55,000,000 metric tons; liquid fuel (all types)-15,750,000 barrels; and shipping-2,040,000 metric tons. In view of the state of Japanese economy at the time, these goals were completely unrealistic. (Cf. pp. 533-4) Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit., Report No. 9, 25 Jan 45. (5) On 20 January, Imperial General Headquarters planned a last emergency effort to transport vital strategic raw materials from the southern area. This was to be a blockade-running operation along the China coast, involving a strong naval and air escort. The plan, designated the Nan-Go Operation, called for the transport of 750,000 barrels of oil and quantities of rubber and bauxite to the Homeland during March. Daikaishi Dai Gohyaku-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 500) 20 Jan 45.

25 Dairikumei Dai Sennihyakunijuhachi, Sennihyakusanjuroku, Sennihyakuyonjuni, Sennihyakuyonjugo-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Orders No. 1228, 1236, 1242, and 1245) 22 Jan, 27 Jan, 3 Feb, and 6 Feb 45.

26 Although it was not mentioned in the "Outline of Army and Navy Operations," the Army Section felt that there was a chance the enemy might attempt a secondary landing in the Tokai district around Nagoya. Defense of this district was therefore added to the missions of the General Defense Command. Special concern was felt for the coastal areas on both sides of the entrance to Ise Bay.

27 The operational missions of the Korea Army were assumed by the Seventeenth Area Army which was activated on 6 February as part of the reorganization plan. (Cf. p. 546.) Since the transfer, 20 November 1944, of the 19th Division to the Fourteenth Area Army in the Philippines (Cf. Chapt. XIII, n. 159), the principal operational strength of the Korea Army consisted of three depot divisions.

28 (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 359-65. (2) Statement by Lt. Col. Katsuki Mizumachi, Staff Officer (Operations), Sixth Air Army. (3) Although the Army air forces at this time were weaker numerically than the Navy's, the Army High Command had a very optimistic outlook on the pro duction and training situation. It was relatively easier for the Army to train pilots for attack on enemy transports since the Navy's mission of attacking carriers and other combat types required more skillful personnel. As far as the Navy was concerned, it was extremely difficult to foresee the actual availability of strength at the end of March. It therefore assumed a conservative attitude toward making its commitment under the agreement final. Although Army ratification was immediate, the Navy delayed final action until 1 March while studying the actual trends of production and training. (Statements by Capt. Ohmae and Col. Sugita, both previously cited). (4) The Naval High Command nevertheless recognized that positive measures should be adopted in an effort to delay the enemy's next operation as long as possible. Accordingly, plans were completed by mid-February for a force of Kyushu based long-range bombers to conduct a surprise raid against an enemy carrier group in Ulithi anchorage. This attack, designated the Second Tan Operation was executed on 11 March but was assessed as completely unsuccessful on the basis of subsequent photographic reconnaissance. Only 11 of the original 24 planes arrived over Ulithi, and these arrived after sunset, rendering accurate bombing impossible. Okinawa Area Naval Operations, op. Cit., pp. 22-7. (American Editors Note: In early August 1944, The Combined Fleet planned to carry out an air attack on the Allied carrier groups anchored in the Majuro Atoll (Marshall Islands) in order to delay the next Allied invasion. This plan, designated the First Tan Operation, called for a long range, one way flight, by Navy land based medium bombers; however, the plan was never put into effect.)

29 (1) Iwo Jima and Ryuku Islands Air Operations Record, op. cit., p. 15. (2) Statement by Lt. Col. Mizumachi, previously cited.

30 (1) Okinawa Area Naval Operations, op. cit., pp. 13-4. (2) It was intended that, should a decisive air battle be fought over the East China Sea, the Third Air Fleet would constitute a reinforcement pool for Fifth Air Fleet. (Statement by Capt. Ohmae, previously cited).

31 During the early period of the war the principal functions of the district armies, centering around the activation, organization and training of newly formed units, had been carried out directly under the command of Imperial General Headquarters. The General Defense Command existed as a headquarters solely for the purpose of exercising operational control over the district armies in matters connected with internal security and air defenses. (Cf. Plate No. 10) In May 1944, however, the General Defense Command was invested with complete operational control over the Eastern, Central and Western District Armies, each of the latter continuing to deal directly with the War Ministry in all logistical matters. Shortly thereafter, pursuant to the provisions of Sho No. 3 plan, these district armies were assigned operational control over the newly organized divisions in their respective areas. (1) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 1-13. (2) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 242-3. (3) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit.

32 The commander of each Area Army was also the commander of the District Army Command and therefore held a dual responsibility, reporting to the Commander-in-Chief, General Defense Command, for operations and to the War Ministry for logistics and administration.

33 (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., p. 325. (2) Dairikumei Dai sennihyakuyonjuyon-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1244) 6 Feb 45. (3) The "Outline of Army and Navy Operations" had in effect called for a shift in emphasis from the Northeast Area to central and western Japan. The requirements of the Fifth Area Army were accordingly scaled down in subsequent reorganizations and redeployments. This process began on 23 January with the transfer of Twenty-seventh Army headquarters to Sendai where it was subsequently reorganized as Headquarters, Eleventh Area Army. Dairikume, Dai Senninyakunijuku-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1229) 22 Jan 45.

34 The 84th Division was at Himeji staging for Okinawa. (Cf. n. 17, p. 541.) On 22 January, on the eve of its scheduled departure, Imperial General Headquarters directed that the division remain in the Homeland. Lt. Gen. Shuichi Miyazaki, Chief, First Bureau (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, felt that the forces on the defense perimeter were already sufficient without the addition of this division, and that the extremely weak state of the Homeland defense forces justified its diversion. On 6 February, it was assigned to Fifteenth Area Army, pending its final deployment. The withholding of this division from Okinawa was to have grave consequences. (Cf. n. 64) (1) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit. (2) Statement by Col. Sugita, previously cited. (3) Historical Data, Thirty-second Army, op. cit.

35 In addition, three infantry brigades, the 1st, 2d and 3d Tokyo Garrison Brigades, were organized and placed under the Eastern District Army Command with a specific mission of carrying out guard duty only. Of the mixed brigades, the 95th was stationed at Hachinohe, the 96th in Chiba Prefecture, the 97th in the Ise Bay area, and the 98th in the Ariake Bay area. In addition, two divisions were activated, the 79th in Korea and the 96th in Kyushu, for subsequent assignment to the Seventeenth Area Army on 28 February. (1) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit. (2) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., p. 308. (3) Dairikumei Dai Sennihyakugojuku-go  (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1259) 18 Feb 45.

36 Of these, two divisions and two independent mixed brigades were to be activated in Korea, one division and one independent mixed brigade on Hokkaido, and two divisions in the Kuriles and on Karafuto, the former from the 43d Independent Mixed Brigade and the 69th Independent Mixed Brigade, the latter from the Karafuto Mixed Brigade. (1) Statement by Col. Hosoda, previously cited. (2) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit. (3) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 305-12.

37 In addition one Army headquarters was to be activated in Korea. (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 308-10. (2) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit., Vol. II : First General Army, pp. 8-11, and Attached Maps 1-2; Vol. III: Second General Army, Attached Charts 1-3; Vol. IV, pp. 11-8, 28-38 and Attached Maps 1-2; Vol. V ; Seventeenth Area Army, pp. 10-21. (3) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit. (4) Dairikumei Dai Sennihyakukyujushichi, Sensambyakunijuhachi, Sensambyakugojuichi-go (Imperial General Heaquarters Army Orders Nos. 1297, 1328 and 1351) 8 Apr, to May and 19 Jun 45. (5) Statement by Col. Hosada, previously cited.

38 The coastal combat division was a type organization developed to engage in close-quarter fighting against enemy landings. It was characterized by lower troop strength. In infantry fire power it was superior to the regular line combat division, particularly in grenade dischargers and light and heavy machine guns. In artillery fire power it was markedly inferior. Due to its mission, the coastal combat division was practically immobile having only about one-fourth the horse and vehicular capacity of the average line combat division, this being used primarily for logistic support. Divisions bearing numbers in the 100 and 300 blocks were coastal combat divisions with a few exceptions, and all others were line combat divisions. Dai lichiji oyobi Dai Sanji Doin Shidan Shuyo Heiki Genkyo Hyo (Actual Condition of Ordnance Equipment for Divisions in the 1st and 3d Group Mobilizations) Ordnance Section, Fifteenth Area Army Headquarters, 20 Jun 45.

39 The 321st Division, scheduled for activation in the third mobilization, was to absorb the 65th Independent Mixed Brigade stationed on the Izu Islands. Unit Organization Tables, op. cit.

40 Typical of the partial issue of available weapons were rifles, 50%, light machine guns, 23% infantry cannon, 28%, and antitank guns, 74%. Some categories (e.g. machine guns and light artillery) were already well over 75% available. (Statements by Maj. Tosaku Hirano and Maj. Yoshimichi Furukawa, Staff Officers (Organization and Equipment), Imperial General Headquarters.)

41 Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 17: Production of Japanese Army Ordnance.

42 (1) Showa Niju Nendo Zenki no Kokuki, Tokko Heiki no Seisan Keikaku to Seisan Jisseki (Planned and Actual Production of Aircraft and Tokko Weapons in the First Half on 1945) 2d Demobilization Bureau, 15 Jul 49. Attached Chart II. (2) Statements by Maj. Furukawa, and Maj. Hirano, both previously cited.

43 Production in December was 2,200 and in January 1,900, the loss being due to raw material shortages and air raids. In February, production declined still further to 1,260 mostly as a result of the program of dispersal of the industry carried out in anticipation of heavy enemy air raids. As soon as plants were well established in their new locations, the High Command expected the figure to go back up to the January level. Reports to the Diet, op. cit Summary of Production of Aircraft, Loss of Capacity through Air Raids, 1 Sep 45.

44 Proceedings of the Supreme War Direction Council, op. cit., Report No. 9.

45 On 16 February, about 1000 U. S. carrier planes staged a raid on Tokyo. Attacks of the same scale came on the 17th and 25th. During the last two weeks in February B-29's struck five times at industrial targets in the Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka-Kobe districts. The 25 February raid on Tokyo consisted of at least 530 aircraft, the largest number of B-29's recorded up to that time. (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., p. 322. (2) Dai Niji Sekai Taisen Ryakureki Otsu (Abridged Chronicle of World War II, B) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Mar 46. Part III, pp. 30-1. (3) Jiji Year Book (1947), OP. Cit., p. 151.

46 (1) Central Pacific Operations Record, op. Cit., Vol. 1, p. 121. (2) Iwo Jima Sakusen (Iwo Jima Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Jan 48, pp. 4-5.

47 (1) Kushu Saigai Jokyo Ichiran Hyo (Chart of Damages by Air Raids) Metropolitan Police Board of Tokyo, 1949. (2) "The raid was in an area off the Sumida River criss-crossed by many rivers and canals .... This was all encircled with fire .... People were unable to escape. They were found later piled up on the bridges, roads, and in the canals, 80,000 dead and twice that number injured. We were instructed to report on actual conditions. Most of us were unable to do this because of horrifying conditions beyond imagination." U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Morale Division, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale, Jun 47, pp. 36-7. (Statement by an unidentified official of the Police Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs.)

48 (1) Okinawa Area Naval Operations, op. Cit., p. 11. (2) Daikaishi Dai Gohyakuju-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 510) 1 Mar 45.

49 (1) Daikaishi Dai Gohyakujusan-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 513) 20 Mar 45. (2) The Navy was by this time convinced that the East China Sea air operation would be decisive as regards the future defense of the Homeland and planned a maximum effort. The Navy's concept differed from the Army's in that the Army regarded the operation as a perimeter defense or delaying action, rather than as decisive. Bakugeki Chosa Dan Kaigun Bunkakai Dai Shichi-go ni taisuru Kaito (Reply of the Navy Ministry to Questionnaire No. 7, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division) 18 Oct 45.

50 This was in line with the policy contained in the Army-Navy Air Agreement of hoarding aircraft against the date of the actual invasion. (Cf. pp. 544-5) (1) Dai Go Koku Kantai Sakusen Kiroku (Fifth Air Fleet Operations) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Aug 46, p. 19. (2) Okinawa Area Naval Operations, op. cit., pp. 27-8.

51 (1) Okinawa Area Naval Operations, op. Cit., pp. 28-9. (2) Fifth Air Fleet Operations, op. Cit., pp. 19-20. (3) The Japanese were again faced with the dilemma so familiar in the Philippines. If the air forces were now committed against enemy carriers, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make a maximum effort against the amphibious convoy when it later appeared. On the other hand, if the air forces were not committed against the carriers, the Japanese ran the risk of having them completely destroyed on the ground. (Statement by Rear Adm. Tomioka, previously cited.)

52 Subsequently three other separate enemy task groups were discovered in the vicinity. It was believed that none of these contained transports. Fifth Air Fleet Operations, op. Cit., pp. 20-1.

53 (1) On 18 March, the enemy carriers flew off 1400 sorties mainly against airfields in central and southern Kyushu. Shikoku and the coast of Wakayama Prefecture were also hit. Ibid., pp. 21-4. (2) As this battle began, Sixth Air Army commenced its planned move to Kyushu, the headquarters reaching Fukuoka on 18 March. Operational units were still scattered throughout the Home Islands. Iwo Jima and Ryukyu Islands Air Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 26-7, 31-2.

54 Fifth Air Fleet reported that five carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, and one unidentified vessel had been sunk in these attacks. Imperial General Headquarters was inclined to seriously doubt the accuracy of these figures, but the Combined Fleet felt that the enemy had been dealt a heavy blow even if the report were discounted by half. (1) Fifth Air Fleet Operations, op. Cit., p. 26 (2) Statements by Rear Adm. Tomioka and Capt. Fuchida, both previously cited.

55 (1) An exception was the 8th Air Division on Formosa which remained under the command of Tenth Area Army. (2) Dairikumei Dai Sennihyakushichijuhachi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1278) 19 Mar 45 and Daikaishi Dai Gohyakujuni-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 512) 19 Mar 45. (3) The Navy, on 20 March, officially adopted the Army code name Ten-Go to apply to all air operations over the East China Sea area. Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 513, op. Cit.

56 Despite their destructiveness, these raids had no immediate effect on aircraft production. As a result of the completion of the dispersal program in the aircraft industry, the output of aircraft actually increased to 1900 in March from February's low of 1260. Summary of Production of Aircraft, Loss of Capacity through Air Raids, op. cit.

57 (1) Senkyo Shubo   (Daily Record of the War Situation) Operations Section, Army General Staff. (2) In addition, the U. S. carrier task force joined in the attack on Kyushu air bases on 28 and 29 March. On 31 March carrier planes struck in great force at airfields on Tokunoshima in the Ryukyus, causing extensive damage. This forward air base, a little over loo miles north of Okinawa was an installation vitally important to the successful conduct of the Ten-Go operation. Its interdiction was a severe blow. Iwo Jima and Ryukyu Islands Air Operations Record, op. cit., pp. 40, 42.

58 (1) Daily Record of the War Situation, op. cit. (2) Statement by Capt. Oi, previously cited.

59 Statistics and Analysis Reports, Report No. 1, op. cit. The Nan-Go Operation (Cf. n. 24) for the emergency transportation of material from the southern area was ended on 18 March, having fallen far short of expectations. The submarine threat plus the enemy air patrols being flown off Clark Field, Manila, and Puerto Princesa airdromes closed down the one-time southern lifeline of the Empire completely. There was no further trade after this date. (1) Statement by Capt. Oi, previously cited. (2) Daikaishi Dat Gohyakujuicht-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Directive No. 511) 16 Mar 45.

60 (1) Okinawa Area Naval Operations, op. cit., p. 34. (2) Fifth Air Fleet Operations, op. Cit., p. 28.

61 On the next day, 26 March, Combined Fleet ordered all forces to execute the Ten-Go operation. Okinawa Area Naval Operations, op. cit., p. 36.

62 On 26 March, Third Air Fleet and Tenth Air Fleet were placed under the command of Fifth Air Fleet, thus unifying the operational command of all naval air forces in the Homeland. Ibid., p. 36.

63 Historical Data, Thirty-second Army, op. cit., p. 36.

64 Until November 1944, the Thirty-second Army on Okinawa had a combat strength of three divisions and one mixed brigade. On 13 November, however, Imperial General Headquarters ordered the transfer to Formosa of the 9th Division, the strongest of the three divisions on Okinawa, to replace the 10th Division, which was being shipped from Formosa to the Philippines. The 9th Division displaced from Okinawa to Formosa in mid-January 1945. Imperial General Headquarters planned to assign the 84th Division to Thirty-second Army to replace the 9th, but late in January this plan was abandoned in favor of retaining the 84th Division in the Homeland. (Cf. n. 34) The permanent loss of one division forced Thirty-second Army to weaken drastically its plans for the defense of Okinawa. (1) Okinawa Sakusen Kiroku (Okinawa Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Aug 46, pp. 3-5. (2) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., p. 357. (3) Historical Data, Thirty-second Army op. cit., pp. 8, 15-20.

65 (1) Okinawa Area Naval Operations, op. cit., pp. 42-3. (2) U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Naval Analysis Division, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, Appendix 103 (Action Report of 2d Destroyer Squadron).

66 In this attack, two battleships, three cruisers, eight destroyers, three minesweepers, twenty one transports, and 25 unidentified vessels were reported sunk. In addition, 61 other vessels were claimed damaged. This attack was the first of a series of ten general attacks conducted between 6 April and 22 June. Due to attrition, they progressively diminished in size, and the last three were relatively minor affairs. These general attacks were heavily interspersed with small-scale attacks, which kept the enemy almost continuously engaged. Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 4: Commitment and Losses of Japanese Aircraft and Damages Inflicted on Allied Forces in the Okinawa Air Operations, 25 Mar-22 Jun 45 .

67 This was the last Japanese naval sortie of the war. Okinawa Area Naval Operations, op. cit., pp. 52-5.

68 General attack Nos. 2, 3, and 4 were executed on 12-13, 15-16, and 21-28 April respectively. A total of 1,272 sorties were flown, of which 565 were tokko missions. General attack No. 5, which was coordinated with the ground offensive of Thirty-second Army, was carried out on 4-5 May, with a total of 381 sorties, of which 196 were tokko. During all of this period, enemy B-29's continued to blast Kyushu airfields, seriously disrupting the mounting of general attacks in planned strength, interrupting the flow of reinforcements into the theater, and reducing supply and maintenance installations. The Japanese were never able to deploy the 4,500 aircraft called for in the Ten-Go plan. Statistics and Analysis Reports, op. cit., Report No. 4.

69 Two carriers, one (carrier or cruiser), six battleships, four (battleships or cruisers), three cruisers, one destroyer, one (cruiser or destroyer), six transports, two patrol craft and seventeen unidentified vessels were reported sunk. In addition, 45 vessels, including two carriers, were reported damaged. (1) Ibid. (2) Fifth Air Fleet Operations, op. cit., pp. 45, 49-50, 59-60.

70 During the climax of the Ten-Go operation (general attacks Nos. 1-5), the Japanese lost 1,711 aircraft, seriously reducing the combat potential of the air forces. However, a total of 159 enemy ships were reported sunk (including those sunk in minor operations) and 141 damaged. It was not until after the war that access to Allied records revealed to the Japanese that only 17 vessels were actually sunk though a considerable number was damaged in varying degrees.

71 The Navy did not at this time issue a detailed operations plan for Homeland defense. Navy general policy had already been announced in the "Outline Plan of Immediate Operations" of 20 March. (Cf. pp. 551-2.) Intensely preoccupied with the Ten-Go operation, the Navy delayed detailed planning for Ketsu-Go. Little action was called for by the High Command in any case, since all Ketsu-Go planning had been delegated to Combined Fleet. (Statement by Capt. Ohmae, previously cited.)

72 (1) Dairikumei Dai Sennihyakukyujukyu-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1299) 8 Apr 45. (Plate No. 147 is a facsimile reproduction of a portion of this document.) (2) Dairikushi Dai Nisenyonhyakusanjuhachi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 2438) 8 Apr 45, Annex: Outline of Operational Preparations for Operational Preparations for Operations Ketsu: Logistics Plan. (3) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 337-47.

The original Ketsu-Go plan was designed only for the initial direct invasion. No second battle was envisaged or considered in drafting these plans, though, of course, it was recognized that a defense of Kanto would be executed if Kyushu were invaded first. (Statements by Maj. Gen. Masakazu Amano, Chief, Operations Section, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section, and Col. Hosoda, previously cited.)

73 Air concentration for Ketsu-Go was to be over and above the commitment to Ten-Go. (Cf. Chapter XIX, n. 45) At this time the utilization of aircraft was running about two months behind production. Thus, new aircraft being used in the Ten-Go operation in April and May were largely out of February and March production. Assuming that Ten-Go would be completed during May, then all aircraft production after 1 April could be made available for Ketsu-Go. (Statement by Maj. Gen. Sadanori Harada, Air Ordnance Department, Munitions Ministry.)

74 This redeployment plan was based on the assumption that sea and rail communications in Japan would be largely destroyed and that most of the troop movements would be made on foot. Maximum possible use was to be made, however, of existing highway, water, and rail routes. The main communications route was to be the Aomori-Sendai- Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka-Shimonoseki line, backbone of the rail system on Honshu. Maximum use was also to be made of secondary routes and highways. Scheduled water routes from Honshu to Kyushu and Shikoku were to be set up with a total capacity of 9,500 tons daily. Even so, considerable difficulty was anticipated in the execution of this plan. For example, 65 days would have been required to carry out the planned move of two divisions from Kyushu to Nagano Prefecture. Another ten days would be needed to move these divisions into the line in the Kanto area.

75 The plan called for the emergency transportation of 296,100 barrels of fuel and lubricants and 20,000 tons of ammunition from the continent to Japan before the end of August.

76 Build-up targets included ammunition for 48 divisions for one campaign (96,000 tons), of which 22 were to be disposed in the Kanto, and 12 in Kyushu; 223,600 barrels of fuel (excluding aviation gasoline), of which 77,500 barrels were to be disposed in the Kanto and 51,000 in Kyushu; and two and one-quarter months supply of rations and clothing for 2,900,000 troops.

77 The operational stockpiling program included ammunition for one campaign by 24 divisions (48,000 tons), of which 8 would be in the Kanto and 8 in Kyushu; 25,800 barrels of fuel (excluding aviation gasoline), of which 7,500 would be in the Kanto and 6,900 in Kyushu; and one month's supply of rations and clothing for 820,000 men.

78 The reserve stockpiling program called for ammunition for one campaign by 24 divisions, of which 14 would be in the Kanto and 4 in Kyushu ; 204,000 barrels of fuel; and rations and clothing for one month for 575,000 men.

79 Under the arming program, approximately 3,790 metric tons of bombs were scheduled for delivery to operational units.

80 Also provided for in the same order was the transfer of the Thirty-sixth Army, formerly the central mobile reserve directly under the General Defense Command, to the Twelfth Area Army. (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1297, op. cit. (2) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 332-6.

81 Ibid.

82 The Air General Army assumed command of the First Air Army, the 51st, 52d and 53d Air Divisions, and the 30th Fighter Group. (1) Dairikumei Dai Sennihyakukyujuhachi-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1298) 8 Apr 45. (2) Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1299, op. cit. (3) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp., 332-4.

83 In addition, two line combat divisions (the 88th and 89th), one coastal combat division (the 167th) and one independent mixed brigade (the 101st) were activated for Fifth Area Army on Hokkaido and two coastal combat divisions (the 150th and 160th) and one independent mixed brigade (the 108th) were activated in Korea. An important redeployment had also been effected with the transfer of the 44th and 84th Divisions from Fifteenth Area Army to Twelfth Area Army to strengthen the defenses of the Kanto. (1) Imperial General Headquarters Army High Command Record, op. cit., pp. 332-4. (2) Homeland Operations Record, op. cit. Vol. II, p. 8 and Map. I ; Vol. III, Chart I ; and Vol. IV, pp. 28-9; Vol. V, pp. 18-20. (3) Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1297, op. cit. (4) Dairikumei Dai Sennihyakushichijuroku, Dai Sennihyakuhachijusan-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Orders No. 1176, No. 1283) 10 Mar 45, 26 Mar 45. (5) Unit Organization Tables, op. cit.

84 (1) Dairikushi Dai Nisenyonhyakuyonju-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 2440) 8 Apr 45. Annex: Army-Navy Joint Agreement. (2) Dairikumei Dai Sensambyakuni-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Order No. 1302) 8 Apr 45.

85 Inability to conclude an air agreement at this time resulted from the Navy's preoccupation with the Ten-Go operation. This agreement was actually delayed until July. (Cf. Chapter XIX, p. 595.)

86 Daikairei Dai Sanjukyu-go (Imperial General Headquarters Navy Order No. 39) 25 Apr 45.

87 (1) Hondo Joriku ni taisuru Hangeki Sakusen Jumbi (Preparations for Counterattack Operations in Defense of the Homeland) 2d Demobilization Bureau, Mar 47, pp. 17-22, 24-5. (2) Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 2438, Annex, op. cit. (3) Hondo Homen Koku Sakusen Kiroku (Homeland Area Air Operations Record) 1st Demobilization Bureau, Dec 46., pp. 411, 101-2, 113. (4) Homeland Operations, op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 55-6; Vol. III, Supplement: Essentials of Sixteenth Area Army Ketsu-Go Operation Plan, pp. 5-10. (5) Kokumin Kosen Hikkei (National Resistance Manual) Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 26 Apr 45. (6) Kokudo Kessen Kyorei (Decisive Battle Manual) Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters, 20 Apr 45.

88 Due mainly to the fuel situation, Fleet participation was to be limited to submarine and destroyer operations. The remainder of the surface fleet was to remain in port and function as stationary AA batteries. The Navy still had 13 large submarines for use in enemy rear areas. In addition, four mammoth submarines, each carrying two or three seaplanes, and 21 short-range submarines were available. (1) Japanese Naval Vessels at the End of War, 2d Demobilization Bureau, 25 Apr 47, pp. 35-6. (2) Preparations for Counterattack Operations in Detense of the Homeland, op. Cit., p. 22.

89 Under the original Ketsu-Go plan, the missions of the coastal combat divisions and line combat divisions were slightly different from those outlined here. The coastal combat divisions were to be charged only with containing the enemy beachhead in a shallow salient until the decisive battle reserve could participate in a general counteroffensive. This was not to be launched until all units were in positions and ready. Largely due to fear that enemy consolidation of a beachhead, no matter how shallow, would make it impossible to dislodge the invaders, this tactical policy was later modified as set forth here. (1) Decisive Battle Manual, op. cit., pp. 14-24. (2) Statements by Lt. Gen. Torashiro Kawabe, Deputy-Chief, Army General Staff, and Lt. Col. Shiro Hara, Staff Officer (Operations), Imperial General Headquarters, Army Section.

90 The heaviest tank available to the Japanese was the 17.2-ton Type-1, having 50 mm armor and mounting a 47 mm gun. The American forces, on the other hand, were employing large numbers of M 4 medium tanks weighing 30 tons, carrying 85 mm armor, and mounting a 75 mm gun. The Japanese Type-4 medium tank, similar in technical characteristics to the American M 4, was barely out of the pilot model stage. The heaviest antitank gun used by the Japanese was 47 mm. This was effective against the U.S. M 4 only at short ranges. Plans were laid to use the 75 mm Type-90 field gun for antitank purposes. A limited amount of an extremely effective hollow-charge shell, patterned after German designs, was manufactured for these weapons before the end of hostilities. (Statements by Lt. Gen. Tomio Hara, Chief, 4th Technical Research Laboratory (Armor) and Sagami Army Arsenal and Lt. Col. Yoshitaka Yoshinaga, Technical Section, Army Ordnance Department.

91 Since the Homeland battle was considered a decisive and not a delaying action, it was manifestly impossible for the infantry to flee from the enemy tanks and hole up in caves. Each man was to be prepared to attack enemy tanks with special weapons. These included a hand-thrown, shaped-charge bomb similar to the American "beehive" charge, various types of "Molotov cocktail," the blanket mine, a cushion-shaped explosive bag which could be hung on projections outside the tank, and "satchel" charges which were carried on the back, turning the attacker into a "human bomb." (1) Dairikushi Dai Nisengohyakunijugo-go (Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive No. 2525) 12 Jul 45. (2) Statement by Lt. Col. Yoshinaga, previously cited.

92 Statements by Lt. Gen. Kawabe, and Lt. Gen. Miyazaki, both previously cited.

93 It was not the intention of the High Command that children or the sick and aged should be drawn into the Homeland battle. There were, however, seemingly insurmountable obstacles to the evacuation of civilians from the coastal areas. For one thing, almost all food production depended upon the labor of these non-combatants. Food could only be grown in the arable land near the coast. The physical problems of evacuation-transportation, food, shelter, and sanitary facilities for millions of people-also militated against this move. The local commanders had still not found effective measures to cope with these difficult problems by the time of the surrender. (Statements by Col. Fuwa and Lt. Gen. Kawabe, both previously cited.)

94 Bogyo Senryaku oyobi Senjitsu ni kansuru Kaito (Reply to Questionnaire Concerning Defense Tactics and Strategy) 1st Demobilization Bureau, 31 Mar 46. (2) National Resistance Manual, op. cit.

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